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ABSTRACT
We quantify the eﬀect of ﬁnancial leverage on stock return volatility in a dynamic general
equilibrium economy with debt and equity claims. The eﬀect of ﬁnancial leverage is studied both
at a market and a ﬁrm level where the ﬁrm is exposed to both idiosyncratic and market risk.
In a benchmark economy with both a constant interest rate and constant price of risk, ﬁnancial
leverage generates little variation in stock return volatility at the market level but signiﬁcant
variation at the individual ﬁrm level. In an economy that generates time-variation in interest
rates and the price of risk, there is signiﬁcant variation in stock return volatility at the market
and ﬁrm level. In such an economy, ﬁnancial leverage has little eﬀect on the dynamics of stock
return volatility at the market level. Financial leverage contributes more to the dynamics of
stock return volatility for a small ﬁrm.
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The leverage eﬀect is that stock volatility is negatively correlated to stock returns—stock volatility
tends to increase when stock prices drop. There are two common economic explanations for the
leverage eﬀect. The ﬁrst explanation is based on the relationship between volatility and expected
returns. When volatility rises, expected returns tend to increase, leading to a drop in the stock price.
As a consequence, volatility and stock returns are negatively correlated. The second explanation
is based on ﬁnancial leverage. When stock prices fall, ﬁnancial leverage increases, leading to an
increase in stock return volatility.
No consensus exists on the size of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial leverage on stock volatility. Empirical
studies that quantify the eﬀect have produced mixed results, but these studies face several diﬃcul-
ties. Any study of the eﬀect of ﬁnancial leverage on volatility should use market debt valuations,
which are diﬃcult to obtain in practice. The empirical literature also lacks a theoretical benchmark
for asset volatilities consistent with many features of asset pricing data in the presence of both debt
and equity claims. We provide such a benchmark.
The hypothesis that ﬁnancial leverage can explain the leverage eﬀect was ﬁrst discussed by
Black (1976) and Christie (1982). Christie (1982) provides empirical evidence—based on a sample
of large ﬁrms—for the negative relationship between stock returns and volatility induced by ﬁnancial
leverage. Duﬀee (1995) argues that such a relationship does not hold when small ﬁrms are also
included in the sample. Schwert (1989) shows empirically that ﬁnancial leverage cannot fully
account for the observed variation in market volatility. Figlewski and Wang (2000) document a
stronger leverage eﬀect in down markets than in up markets. Campbell and Hentschel (1992)
and Bekaert and Wu (2000) provide econometric models of asymmetric volatility. None of these
empirical studies use market debt values to compute ﬁnancial leverage.
Wu (2001) builds a partial equilibrium model to study the sources of asymmetric volatility.
Tauchen (2005) builds a general equilibrium model with an endogenous volatility asymmetry. In
both models, the leverage eﬀect is mainly determined by the relationship between volatility and
expected returns since neither of these theoretical models include corporate debt. We provide a
benchmark general equilibrium economy with debt to study the eﬀects of ﬁnancial leverage on the
1dynamics of stock volatility.
Our work explores the dynamics of stock volatility at both a market and a ﬁrm level. We
characterize the economic channels through which ﬁnancial leverage drives the dynamics of stock
volatility, and quantify the leverage eﬀect. The assumptions in Black (1976) and Christie (1982) are
a constant asset return volatility and a constant riskless debt return. Both assumptions are incon-
sistent with realistic asset prices. We therefore study two diﬀerent economies. In both economies,
the cash ﬂows generated by a ﬁrm’s assets are speciﬁed exogenously, have a constant volatility, and
are split into an exogenously speciﬁed riskless debt service and a dividend stream to equity holders.
We derive the equilibrium prices and dynamics of all ﬁnancial claims. We identify the economic
forces behind the dynamics of stock volatility and quantify the eﬀect of ﬁnancial leverage on the
dynamics of stock volatility.
The ﬁrst economy we study is consistent with the assumptions in Black (1976) and Christie
(1982). Here, macroeconomic conditions are ﬁxed and ﬁnancial leverage is the only driving force
behind the dynamics of stock volatility. A ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial leverage is solely driven by innovations
to the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows. Financial leverage generates little variation at the market level where
cash ﬂow volatility is low, and signiﬁcant variation at the ﬁrm level where cash ﬂow volatility is
higher. When ﬁnancial leverage is the only factor aﬀecting the dynamics of stock volatility, the
leverage eﬀect hypothesis holds at the ﬁrm level although stock volatility does not vary enough to
be consistent with empirical evidence.
The second economy has a representative agent with habit persistent preferences similar to
Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Such preferences lead to more realistic asset prices than in the
ﬁrst economy. The driving force in this economy is counter-cyclical risk aversion caused by external
habit formation in the representative agent’s preferences. The model is calibrated to several features
of empirical asset prices, including the level and variation of the equity premium, the riskless rate,
and the market price of risk. We simulate the economy and explore the time-series behavior of a
ﬁrm’s stock returns and volatility allowing for both debt and equity. At both the daily and monthly
frequencies, we ﬁnd at most a weak relationship between returns and volatility. We conclude
that ﬁnancial leverage has little economic signiﬁcance at the market level when macroeconomic
2conditions lead to realistic dynamics for the riskless rate and the market price of risk. But at the
ﬁrm level, ﬁnancial leverage can partially explain variations in stock return volatility.
2. Model
2.1. The Economy
We consider a continuous-time pure-exchange economy with a ﬁnite horizon T. Uncertainty in the
economy is represented by the ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F,{Ft},P), with F ≡ FT, on which
is deﬁned a two-dimensional Brownian motion W = (Wa,Wi). The ﬁltration {Ft} is generated
by W, augmented by the null sets. The uncorrelated components of the Brownian motion W
represent an aggregate consumption shock Wa and an idiosyncratic shock Wi. The idiosyncratic
shock is only used when studying the asset pricing of a small ﬁrm embedded in the economy.
All stochastic processes introduced are assumed to be progressively measurable, all (in)equalities
involving random variables hold P-a.s., and all stochastic diﬀerential equations are assumed to have
solutions without explicitly stating the required regularity.
The exogenous aggregate output in the economy δ(t) is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian
motion with dynamics given by
dδ(t) = δ(t)[µδdt + σδdWa(t)], δ0 > 0, (1)
where µδ and σδ are scalars.
Preferences are modeled in the economy by a representative agent with external habit formation
preferences as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). The representative agent maximizes expected










where C(t) is the representative agent’s consumption, X(t) is the habit level, γ captures the risk
aversion with respect to surplus consumption, and ρ is the subjective discount factor. When
X(t) = 0 for all t, the preferences are identical to a CRRA utility representation with coeﬃcient of
3relative risk aversion equal to γ.
In equilibrium, the representative investors consumes aggregate output:
C(t) = δ(t). (3)
To complete our description of preferences, the process governing the habit X(t) must be deﬁned.
Following Campbell and Cochrane (1999), we assume that the habit is external; agents do not









with the second equality from the equilibrium condition (3).





Unless noted otherwise, lower case letters denote the natural logarithms of the variables. The
dynamics of s(t) are
ds(t) = φ(¯ s − s(t))dt + λ(s(t))σδdWa(t), s(0) ∈ (0,smax), (6)
where φ is the mean-reversion rate, ¯ s is the steady-state level, and σδ is the volatility of the
aggregate consumption growth with ¯ S and smax deﬁned as





smax = ¯ s + 0.5 ×
 
1 − ¯ S2
, (8)
with B a constant. As in Wachter (2006), our model is an extension of Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) to incorporate stochastic interest rates. The parameter B determines the sensitivity of
interest rates to the output shock. If B = 0, our model is the same as in Campbell and Cochrane
4(1999) with constant interest rates.





1 − 2(s − ¯ s) − 1. (9)
Given λ(s) > 0, the habit and aggregate consumption move together as any intuitive deﬁnition of
habit would require.
The surplus-consumption ratio S(t) captures the state of the economy. A low surplus-consumption
ratio implies that the economy has been hit by a succession of bad shocks; current consumption is
low compared to the historical average which is captured by the habit. Alternatively, a high S(t)
is an indicator of a good state of the economy, in which the agent enjoys higher consumption levels
compared to his habit. The local curvature of the utility function,
γ
S(t), varies counter-cyclically
with S(t) and generates a counter-cyclical market price of risk in our model.
The representative investor ﬁnances his optimal consumption stream by trading in a locally
riskless money market with price B(t) and the market portfolio with price V (t). The market
portfolio is a claim to aggregate consumption; the cash ﬂow from the market portfolio is split into
debt and equity. The money market is in zero net-supply, while the market portfolio is in positive
net-supply, normalized to one. The posited dynamics of the two securities are
dB(t) = B(t)r(t)dt, B(0) > 0, (10)
dV (t) + δ(t)dt = V (t)[µV (t)dt + σV,a(t)dWa(t)], V (T) = 0, (11)
where the price system (r,µV ,σV,a) is determined in equilibrium.
Given our main goal is to explore the volatilities of debt and equity claims to V as well as
a small ﬁrm exposed to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, it is convenient to summarize the
endogenous price system in terms of a state price density process ξ(t) with dynamics given by
dξ(t) = −ξ(t)[r(t)dt + κ(t)dWa(t)], ξ(0) = 1, (12)
5where κ(t) , σ−1
V,t [µV (t) − r(t)] is the market price of risk in the economy.
The representative agent’s complete markets dynamic opportunity set from trading the money
market and the market is summarized by a static budget constraint using standard martingale






≤ V (0), (13)
where the representative agent is initially endowed with the claim V .
We characterize asset prices using general equilibrium restrictions to identify the equilibrium
state price density process. The equilibrium consumption rules, asset prices, and asset holdings
must clear both the consumption and the ﬁnancial markets, as well as satisfy the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for optimality of the representative agent’s consumption-portfolio problem.
The martingale formulation of the representative agent’s optimal consumption-investment problem
provides us with a direct way to construct the equilibrium (Karatzas et al. (1990)). The state price
density process implied by the marginal utility of the representative agent evaluated at consumption
market clearing: C(t) = δ(t) gives equilibrium asset prices that clear the ﬁnancial markets. The
equilibrium is characterized by solving for the unique state price density process. The necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the representative agent’s optimization problem implies the equilibrium







The endogenous equilibrium parameters r(t) and κ(t) are easily determined in terms of economic
primitives by computing the dynamics of equation (12),










− B (s(t) − ¯ s), (15)
κ(t) = γ (1 + λ(s(t)))σδ. (16)
In particular, r(t) and κ(t) both time vary as they are functions of the log surplus-consumption
ration s(t).
6Additionally, the equilibrium state price density values any marketed consumption stream. In










2.2. The Representative Firm
To evaluate the determinants of the return volatility at the aggregate level, we derive the equilibrium
dynamics of the market portfolio. In our model, the market portfolio is a representative ﬁrm that
pays out the aggregate consumption stream, δ(t), to its outside claimants. To explore leverage and
time-varying risk premium eﬀects on aggregate volatility dynamics, the ﬁrm’s payouts are split the
into two ﬁnancial claims.
The representative ﬁrm’s capital structure consists of debt and equity. All ﬁnancial claims
issued by the ﬁrm are held by the representative agent in the economy. Since the representative
agent holds all claims to the ﬁrm in equilibrium, his incentives are aligned with total ﬁrm value
maximization. In such a ﬁrst-best scenario, bankruptcy due to debt service payment defaults never
occurs along the equilibrium path, and the representative agent covers the debt service by injecting
capital into the ﬁrm when needed. This assumption can be justiﬁed by an inﬁnitesimal, but positive,
bankruptcy cost. As a consequence, debt claims are not subject to default risk. Hence, the payout
claimed by the equity holders is equal to δE(t) = δ(t) − δD(t), where δD(t) is the required debt
service at time t. The speciﬁc terms of the debt service are described later. The total payout
generated by the ﬁrm is invariant to the capital structure of the ﬁrm. We abstract from frictions
such as security issue costs, taxation at both the corporate and personal level, and bankruptcy
costs.
The equilibrium price of the debt claim issued by the representative ﬁrm, D(t), is computed










7where Td ∈ [0,T] is the maturity of the ﬁrm’s debt. The equilibrium debt dynamics are
dD(t) + δD(t)dt = D(t)[(r(t) + κ(t)σD,a(t))dt + σD,a(t)dWa(t)], (19)
for t ∈ [0,Td], with D(Td) = 0, and where σD,a(t) is the endogenous debt return volatility. As
long as the equilibrium interest rate r(t) is time-varying, the volatility of the debt contract will be
non-zero even when the debt service δD(t) is deterministic as the contract is exposed to interest
rate risk.
The equilibrium price of the equity claim of the representative ﬁrm E(t) is
E(t) = V (t) − D(t). (20)
Equity dynamics are
dE(t) + δE(t)dt = E(t)[(r(t) + κ(t)σE,a(t))dt + σE,a(t)dWa(t)], (21)
with E(T) = 0, and where σE,a(t) is the endogenous equity return volatility.1
Equity is a claim to the residual cash ﬂows given the current debt service structure. Since the
Miller and Modigliani Theorem (1958) holds in the model, all future capital structure adjustments
will be zero NPV transactions, and have no consequences on current equity prices and dynamics.
The next lemma formalizes the argument.
Lemma 2.1 Current equity prices and equity return dynamics are invariant to future capital struc-
ture adjustments.
The equilibrium dynamics of the debt and equity claims are fully characterized by equations (19)
and (21), once the conditional volatilities are determined. The procedure followed to numerically
obtain the endogenous asset dynamics is described in Appendix 6.
1Throughout our analysis, we consider market-wide debt recapitalization policies that guarantee positive market
equity valuations.
82.3. A Small Firm
In addition to the representative ﬁrm, we also consider a small ﬁrm in the economy facing market
and idiosyncratic risk. We take the ﬁrm’s investment decisions as given, implying they are unaf-
fected by its ﬁnancing decisions. The ﬁrm is modeled as an EBIT-generating machine, with an











, δf(0) > 0, (22)
where µ
f
δ is the instantaneous growth rate of the cash ﬂows, σ
f
δ,a is the factor loading on the
aggregate shock, and σ
f











The posited dynamics of the ﬁrm value process are:











with V f(T) = 0.
The ﬁrm’s exogenous capital structure consists of debt and equity claims. The ﬁrm’s debt
service is a deterministic stream of cash ﬂows δ
f
D(t) with maturity Td ∈ [0,T]. The debt’s cash
ﬂows are riskless. To ensure this, we assume that the debt holders take control of the ﬁrm when
the value of the EBIT-generating machine falls to the debt’s value. At this point, debt holders can
costlessly replace their claim on the ﬁrm with a riskless security from the capital markets. Since the
equity holders do not have a bankruptcy timing option, the ﬁrm is able to issue debt with riskless
cash ﬂows. However, the debt’s market value is risky due to its exposure to interest rate risk.
































D,i(t) are endogenous factor loadings on
the aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks, respectively.
The ﬁrm’s equity is deﬁned as a claim to the ﬁrm’s residual cash ﬂow as long as the ﬁrm remains
solvent. Deﬁne the stopping time Tb:
Tb = inf{t : V f(t) = Df(t)}. (27)
The value of equity is positive for t ≤ TB and is given by
Ef(t) = V f(t) − Df(t), (28)




















E,i(t) are the endogenous factor loadings on the aggregate
and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks, respectively.
The equilibrium dynamics of the debt and equity claims are fully characterized by equations
(26) and (29), once the factor loadings are determined. A summary of the procedure used to obtain
the asset return dynamics is given in the Appendix.
3. Calibration and Simulation
We calibrate the exogenous model parameters to U.S. post-war data. The output process param-
eters are chosen to ﬁt the annual growth rate of U.S. consumption data; we set µδ = 0.019 and
σδ = 0.015. The parameters that govern the dynamics of the surplus-consumption ratio are chosen
10to ﬁt the empirical moments of asset prices as summarized in the righthand column of Table 1.
The model is broadly consistent with the observed moments of asset prices for φ = 0.1385 and
B = 0.015. Other model parameters are speciﬁed as ρ = 0.09 and γ = 1.8. The ﬁrst two columns
of Table 1 summarize the equilibrium asset pricing implications of our calibrated model. The ﬁrst
column assumes their is no aggregate debt in the economy, while the second column assumes the
aggregate debt in the market takes the form of an annuity with a maturity of Td = 10 and a con-
stant debt service of 60% of current total payouts. With such a capital structure, the unconditional
leverage ratio of the model roughly matches the U.S. mean aggregate leverage ratio from 1952-1998
as documented in Korajczk and Levy (2003).
Equations (9), (15), and (16) imply that the equilibrium riskless rate r(t) and the market price
of risk κ(t) are solely driven by the surplus-consumption ratio. Figure 1 plots the riskless rate, the
market price of risk, and the market’s price-dividend ratio in diﬀerent states of the economy, as
well as the stationary distribution of S(t). Both the riskless rate and market price of risk move
counter-cyclically. At the extremely bad states of the economy, both variables rise dramatically.
The stochastic process of S(t); however, never attains a value of zero and the equilibrium asset
prices are well-deﬁned in all states of the economy. Since the riskless rate ﬂuctuates with the state of
the economy, all ﬁnancial claims to future cash ﬂows are subject to interest rate risk. Similarly, the
counter-cyclical variation in the market price of risk generates time-variation in the price-dividend
ratios of risky claims as can be seen in the bottom panel of Figure 1.
To explore the relationship between stock returns, stock volatility, and ﬁnancial leverage, we
simulate the economy for 2,000 years at a daily frequency. Monthly data is then constructed
using the daily observations. The cash ﬂows of the representative ﬁrm are given by the aggregate
consumption stream in the economy. We simulate two small ﬁrms with diﬀerent cash ﬂow risk
compositions. In particular, both small ﬁrms have identical expected cash ﬂow growth rates µ
f
δ =
0.019 and identical idiosyncratic cash ﬂow risk volatilities σ
f
δ,i = 0.2, whereas their aggregate cash
ﬂow risk volatilities are diﬀerent. We set σ
f
δ,a = 0.015 for the ﬁrm we denote ﬁrm AI and σ
f
δ,a = 0.0
for the ﬁrm we denote ﬁrm I. Therefore, the former has both systematic and idiosyncratic cash ﬂow
risk, while the other ﬁrm has only idiosyncratic cash ﬂow risk.
114. Results - Constant Asset Pricing Moments
Before exploring our fully calibrated economy, it is useful to consider a case fully consistent with
the leverage hypothesis where asset return volatilities are constant. Such a benchmark is easily
constructed by setting the habit level to zero or equivalently by setting φ = 0, ¯ S = 1, and S0 = 1.
The model then collapses to the representative agent having standard power utility preferences.
With power utility preferences and i.i.d. consumption growth, the riskless rate and market price of
risk in the economy are both constant. This leads to unrealistic asset pricing implications, but is
consistent with the assumptions underlying the leverage eﬀect hypothesis. This is a natural place
to start, and a useful benchmark for quantifying the leverage eﬀect.
In this setting, closed-form solutions for the prices of all ﬁnancial are easily obtained. Modeling
the debt service as a constant annuity of Td years with a constant cash ﬂow equal to δD, the market
values of the representative ﬁrms’s total assets and debt are
V (t) =
δ(t)
























2 . The value of the ﬁrm’s
equity is then given by E(t) = V (t) − D(t) as long as E(t) ≥ 0.
For the representative ﬁrm, the debt volatility is zero since there is no interest rate risk. The








A similar expression is obtained for the volatility of a small ﬁrm’s stock. Hence, in this economy,
stock volatility is driven only by the underlying cash ﬂow volatility and the variation in the market
value of ﬁnancial leverage.
To quantify the impact of ﬁnancial leverage on the dynamics of stock volatility, we simulate our
economy.2 In our simulations for the levered aggregate ﬁrm, we assume that the ﬁrm rebalances
2We use the same parameters as in the previous section with X(t) = 0 for all t.
12its debt payments to a target level of 0.3 of total ﬁrm cash ﬂows every 5 years. Table 2 shows
some descriptive statistics from the simulated market level data. When the representative ﬁrm is
unlevered, its stock volatility is identical to the dividend volatility, and shows no variation. When
the representative ﬁrm is levered, its stock volatility rises, and shows some variation over time.
With a realistic level of market leverage around 0.3; however, both the level and the variation in
market volatility is much lower than those observed in the data.
Table 3 and 4 provide similar descriptive statistics for the two small ﬁrms. Since both small
ﬁrms have larger cash ﬂow volatilities than the representative ﬁrm, their stock return volatilities
are both higher on average. Since the debt’s value is constant for a given debt service, more volatile
stock returns lead to more volatile market leverage, which in turn generates further variation in
the stock return volatility.
While the CRRA preferences leads to a signiﬁcant variation in stock volatility at the small ﬁrm
level, the stock volatility dynamics at the market level are quite unrealistic. Additionally, the model
does not generate a realistic spread between the cash ﬂow volatility and the stock volatility.3 While
CRRA preferences imply a constant riskless rate and a constant price of risk, which are consistent
with the ﬁnancial leverage hypothesis as in Christie (1982), several important characteristics of
asset prices are not obtained in this equilibrium.
5. Results - Time-Varying Asset Pricing Moments
We now calibrate our economy to the observed moments of asset prices. In contrast to the special
case studied in the previous subsection, the assumptions of the leverage eﬀect hypothesis are not
satisﬁed in our calibrated economy. Because of the time-variation in riskless rate and market price
of risk, the value of a ﬁrm’s assets will have a time-varying volatility and the value of debt contracts
will be exposed to interest rate risk.
3Shiller (1981) shows stock returns are at least ﬁve times more volatile than their underlying cash ﬂows.
135.1. Market Level Analysis
We consider two diﬀerent debt service structures for the representative ﬁrm: a 10-year constant
annuity and a constant perpetuity.4 While a 10-year debt maturity is realistic, the perpetual
maturity debt is widely used in the corporate ﬁnance literature for technical and computational
simplicity.5 Given we are not solving for optimal capital structures, our framework enables us to
analyze both cases and study the eﬀect of debt maturity on equity return volatility. With either
maturity structure, we adjust the level of the coupon payment such that the debt claim comprises
30% of the total value of the ﬁrm initially.
The total value of the representative ﬁrm is driven by the instantaneous cash ﬂows δ(t) and the
surplus-consumption ratio S(t). The value of the outstanding debt is similarly driven by δd(t) and
S(t). Both the total ﬁrm value and the debt value are proportional to their underlying cash ﬂows.
This implies that the equity value is proportional to its underlying cash ﬂows and depends only on
δe(t) and the surplus-consumption ratio S(t).
To see the impact of the macro factors on market volatility, Figure 4 plots market volatility at
diﬀerent states of the economy keeping the ratio of debt service to total cash ﬂows constant. The
ﬁgure makes clear that even the unlevered ﬁrm has signiﬁcant variation in its stock volatility. In
good states of the economy, i.e. when S is high, stock volatility is low. As the riskless rate and the
market price of risk increases in the economy, stock volatility also rises. In extremely bad states of
the economy, the state variable S has very low volatility to keep it positive, leading to a decrease
in stock volatility. In most states of the economy, however, the inverse relationship between S and
stock volatility obtains.
While both the 10-year annuity and the perpetuity speciﬁcations are constructed with a 30%
ﬁnancial leverage, their implications on the dynamics of market volatility are diﬀerent. The impact
of ﬁnancial leverage on stock volatility is higher when debt maturity is lower. The interest rate risk
exposure of the debt contracts depend on their duration. When debt has a low duration, its value
is less sensitive to increasing interest rates in bad times. Hence, market leverage increases faster as
4In our analysis, we approximate a perpetuity by a 100-year constant annuity. Perturbing the maturity of this
annuity led to similar quantitative results.
5See for example Fischer et al. (1989); Leland (1994); Leland and Toft (1996); Leland (1998); Goldstein et al.
(2001).
14S decreases when debt duration is lower, leading to a higher stock volatility in bad states of the
economy.
We simulate our economy to see how ﬁnancial leverage aﬀects the variation in stock volatility.
We take the debt service as a 10-year annuity with an initial debt service to total cash ﬂow ratio
of 74%, leading to 30% market leverage on average. We assume that the ﬁrm continuously issues
10-year discount bonds to keep the debt maturity constant at every point in time. We also assume
that the ﬁrm readjusts its debt service to 60% of the total cash ﬂows every 5 years. Figure 5 plots
a 100 year window of the simulated market volatility and returns series.
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on asset returns from the simulated data. Financial
leverage has a mean of 0.29 and a standard deviation of 0.06 for the market. When the market is
levered, both the mean and the standard deviation of realized returns increase. The average market
volatility rises from 13.95% to 19.01%, and the standard deviation of market volatility rises from
3.95% to 6.25%. Thus, ﬁnancial leverage has increased both the level and the variation of market
volatility in our simulated data. The increased variation in market volatility, however, does not
necessarily imply that the leverage eﬀect hypothesis holds true. The variation in ﬁnancial leverage
that leads to variation in market volatility can also be driven by changing market conditions.
An implication of the leverage eﬀect hypothesis is high realized returns are associated with low
market volatility. Thus, the probability density of realized returns should be negatively skewed. In
our simulated data, however, leverage leads to a small increase in the skewness of market returns.
The skewness of market returns increase from 0.07 to 0.09 in the daily data, and from 0.18 to 0.28 in
the monthly data. To see whether skewness is indeed increased by leverage, we plot the frequency
distributions of the volatility and returns. To visualize the impact of leverage on the skewness of
market returns, Figure 6 plots the frequency distributions of conditional volatility of equity returns,
realized returns, and expected returns, computed from the daily data. The ﬁgure makes clear that
there no observable change in skewness in market returns when leverage is introduced.
To further explore the relationship between market returns and market volatility caused by
leverage further, we replicate the regression exercises presented by the related empirical literature
using our simulated data. Following Christie (1982), Duﬀee (1995), and Schwert (1989), we consider






= a0 + b0Rt + t+1,0 (33)
log(σt+1) = a1 + b1Rt + t+1,1 (34)
log(σt) = a2 + b2Rt + t,2 (35)








the market value of the ﬁrm’s leverage. Regression (33) was studied by Christie (1982) with b0 < 0
consistent with the ﬁnancial leverage hypothesis. Duﬀee (1995) argued that the source of a negative
coeﬃcient on b0 was a positive contemporaneous relation between ﬁrm equity returns and ﬁrm
equity volatility by estimating the two regressions (34) and (35). Schwert (1989) estimated a
variation of regression (36); b3 > 0 is consistent with the ﬁnancial leverage hypothesis.
To control for the time-variation in the market price of risk, we also consider an augmented
version of regression equation (36):
log(σt+1) = a4 + b4
Dt
Et
+ c4κt + t+1,4 (37)
Table 6 summarizes the results of the regressions which should be interpreted as characterizing
the population moments of our model.6 In the daily data, the regression models (33), (34) and (35)
have no explanatory power regardless of the leverage. Model (36) has a high R2 and a signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient for market leverage. Model (37) makes clear that model (36) has an important omitted
variable: the market price of risk. When the market price of risk is introduced as an independent
variable, the sign of the coeﬃcient of leverage changes. The results of the regressions using the
monthly data is similar except for the signiﬁcant explanatory power of Model (33). The signiﬁcant
negative relationship between realized returns and innovations in market volatility is consistent
with the ﬁnancial leverage hypothesis. But, the ﬁnancial leverage hypothesis implies that the b
6We also ran kernel regressions to detect any non-linear relationships between returns and volatility. As no
signiﬁcant non-linearities were detected, we only present the results for the linear regressions.
16coeﬃcient should be lower with increased ﬁnancial leverage. The explanatory power in model (33)
is therefore not driven by eﬀect of ﬁnancial leverage.
Our analysis of the dynamics of market volatility shows that most of the variation in market
volatility is driven by the variation in market conditions. Financial leverage does not lead to
signiﬁcant skewness in realized returns. The regressions we ran on our simulated data do not
provide support that ﬁnancial leverage is a major driver of stock volatility.
5.2. Small Firm
While the aggregate consumption process restricts the calibration of the representative ﬁrm total
cash ﬂow process, we are able to assume diﬀerent risk loadings on the small ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows. In
this section, we explore the impact of ﬁnancial leverage on the dynamics of stock volatility at the
individual ﬁrm level, and in the presence of idiosyncratic cash ﬂow risk.
We consider two diﬀerent ﬁrms: a ﬁrm with both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk (ﬁrm AI),
and a ﬁrm with only idiosyncratic risk (ﬁrm I). For ﬁrm AI, we set σδ,a = 0.015 and σδ,i = 0.2,
while we set σδ,a = 0.0 and σδ,i = 0.2 for ﬁrm I. We assume that the levered ﬁrm restructures its
debt service to a target debt service to total cash ﬂow ratio every 5 years.
We ﬁrst analyze the equity return volatility dynamics of ﬁrm AI. Figure 7 plots the equity return
volatility in diﬀerent states of the economy. The ﬁgure makes clear that the impact of ﬁnancial
leverage on the dynamics of stock volatility depends on the ﬁrm’s debt duration. With shorter
duration debt, market leverage rises rapidly in the bad states of the world, leading to increased
equity volatility. For the long term debt, leverage increases the level of the equity volatility, but
leverage has little impact on the dynamics of the equity volatility.
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics on asset returns from the simulated data. For the levered
ﬁrm, ﬁnancial leverage has a mean of 0.318 and a standard deviation of 0.117. Leverage increases
the average daily returns from 0.019% to 0.029%. Leverage increases the average equity volatility
from 24.47% to 37.02%. The impact of leverage on the variation in equity volatility is quite
signiﬁcant. Leverage increases the standard deviation of equity volatility from 2.07% to 12.85%.
On the other hand, leverage increases the skewness of the equity returns. Figure 8 plots the
17frequency distributions of equity volatility and returns, and clearly shows that leverage does not
induce negative skewness to equity returns.
Table 8 summarizes the results of the regressions for ﬁrm AI. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship
between realized returns and equity volatility in the daily data. In the monthly data, changes
in market volatility is negatively related to realized returns, as predicted by the leverage eﬀect
hypothesis. The predictive power of this regression, model (33), is quite weak with an R2 of around
12%. Results of regressions (36) and (37) show that leverage has predictive power on stock volatility
even when the market price of risk is included in the regressions as an independent variable. Thus,
our regression analysis provide at least weak evidence supporting the leverage eﬀect hypothesis.
Next, we analyze a small ﬁrm when all cash ﬂow risk is idiosyncratic, ﬁrm I. Figure 9 plots
the equity return volatility in diﬀerent states of the economy. Since all ﬁnancial claims to the cash
ﬂows of the ﬁrm are only subject to idiosyncratic shocks, the eﬀect of changing market conditions
on equity volatility is only through the interest rate risk channel. As before, when debt has a low
duration relative to equity, market leverage increases rapidly in bad times, leading to higher stock
volatility.
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics on asset returns from the simulated data. As before,
leverage increases the level and the variation in stock volatility signiﬁcantly. The variation in
volatility is lower compared to ﬁrm AI. The skewness of the return distribution does not seem to
decrease with leverage.
Table 10 summarizes the results of the regressions for the ﬁrm I. Model 33 provides no support
for the leverage eﬀect hypothesis in both the daily and monthly data. Model 36 provides a signiﬁcant
link between leverage and stock volatility. The predictive power of leverage on stock volatility is
strong even when the market price of risk is included as an independent variable.
Overall, our analysis provides some support that ﬁnancial leverage drives the dynamics of stock
volatility at the ﬁrm level. This feature is driven by idiosyncratic risk inﬂuencing the ﬁrm’s equity
value and not the ﬁrm’s debt value. Hence, the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial leverage can move independent of
market conditions in contrast to our market-wide analysis. Time-varying market conditions are
still important determinants of even ﬁrm I’s equity volatility. Given the ﬁrm’s debt value is still
18driven by systematic interest rate risk, variations in ﬁnancial leverage are still partially explained
by systematic risk which ultimately feeds into the variation in the ﬁrm’s equity volatility.
6. Conclusion
We explore the relationship between ﬁnancial leverage and the dynamics of stock volatility in an
economy with realistic interest rate and market price of risk dynamics. We show that for the
market as a whole, ﬁnancial leverage increases the level of equity volatility, but the dynamics of
equity volatility are mostly driven by a time-varying interest rate and a time-varying market price
of risk. Financial leverage contributes more to the dynamics of stock volatility for a small ﬁrm
exposed to both idiosyncratic risk and market risk. But in both cases, the variation in interest
rates and the market price of risk is the main force behind the dynamics of stock volatility.
Understanding why stock volatility moves over time is crucial for many ﬁnancial applications.
Equilibrium asset pricing models with realistic asset pricing implications can be used to explore the
dynamics of ﬁnancial claims issued by ﬁrms. Our analysis relies on one of many such models, the
habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and assumes a simple riskless debt cash
ﬂow structure. Future work is needed to extend this analysis to other asset pricing frameworks,
and explore the implications of risky debt cash ﬂows to the dynamics of stock volatility.
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In this section, we describe the details of the numerical solution procedure used to compute the
asset return dynamics. We describe the details for the small ﬁrm analysis, since the market level
analysis is a special case with no idiosyncratic risk.
Since the cash ﬂow growth is an i.i.d. process, the total ﬁrm value is characterized by two state
variables, i.e. V f(t) = V f(S(t),δf(t)). A quick observation of equation (23) yields V (S(t),δF(t)) =
δF(t) × V (S(t),1). Hence, to obtain the ﬁrm value, we ﬁrst compute V (S(t),1) for all S(t) ∈
(0,Smax].
Numerically calculating V (S(t),1) in the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) model is problem-
atic; see for example Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2003), Cosimano, Chen, and Himonas
(2003), and Wachter (2005). A convenient way to obtain V (S(t),1) is to compute equation (23)
using a risk-neutral valuation. Under the risk-neutral measure, we can rewrite (23) as








Then, by Monte Carlo simulating r(t) and δf(s) under the risk-neutral measure, and using numerical
integration methods, we evaluate (38). Precise estimates are obtained by using 20,000 paths and
10,000 steps where T = 100.
To obtain the dynamics of the ﬁrm value, we apply Ito’s Lemma on V f(S(t),δf(t)). The





















D(t) × D(S(t),1). Hence, we obtain the debt value by computing D(S(t),1) using Monte Carlo
simulations under the risk-neutral measure. The diﬀusion terms of equation (26) are obtained by













D,i(t) = 0. (42)
As the residual claim, equity value is given by E(t) = δf(t)V f(S(t)) − δ
f
D(t)D(ST,1). The
diﬀusion terms of equity return dynamics (29) are given by
σ
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Proof of Lemma 2.1. Consider a ﬁrm whose assets pay the cash ﬂow stream δ(t) and has a










Consider a capital structure adjustment where the ﬁrm issues new debt contracts that require
a service δD(t) for t ∈ (Ta,Tb], where s < Ta ≤ Tb ≤ T. The value of the newly issued debt Dn is



















































implying that the equity price and dynamics are invariant to the future capital structure.
25Table 1. Key properties of equilibrium asset prices. The levered market has a debt maturity of
Td = 10 and constant debt service at 60% of current total payouts.
Model (Unlevered) Model (Levered) Data
Expected Excess Market Returns 6.7% 8.5% 8.1%
Std. Deviation of Market Returns 13.7% 17.2 % 15.6 %
Expected Riskfree Rate 0.7% 0.7% 0.9%
Std. Deviation of Riskfree Rate 0.7% 0.7% < 1.7%
Expected Market Price of Risk 0.43 0.43 0.39
Leverage 0 0.30 0.30
26Table 2. Descriptive statistics of simulated equilibrium market returns with CRRA preferences.
Unlevered Market
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.034% 0.079% -0.338% 0.404% 0.006 0.009
Monthly Returns 1.040% 0.436% -0.508% 3.055% 0.008 0.041
Conditional Volatility 1.500% 0.0% 1.500% 1.500% N.A. N.A.
Levered Market with Readjustment Every 5 Years
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.035% 0.111% -0.490% 0.558% 0.006 0.012
Monthly Returns 1.041% 0.613% -1.134% 3.830% -0.009 0.047
Conditional Volatility 2.106% 0.030% 1.997% 2.176% -0.490 -0.312
Market Leverage 0.288 0.010 0.249 0.311 -0.552 -0.208
27Table 3. Descriptive statistics of simulated equilibrium small ﬁrm with both systematic and
idiosyncratic cash ﬂow risk equity returns with CRRA preferences.
Unlevered Market
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.030% 1.056% -4.609% 5.193% 0.033 0.017
Monthly Returns 0.905% 5.886% -19.01% 24.99% 0.171 0.067
Conditional Volatility 20.06% 0.0% 20.06% 20.06% N.A. N.A.
Levered Market with Readjustment Every 5 Years
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.028% 1.709% -19.32% 19.98% 0.047 1.817
Monthly Returns 0.857% 9.508% -38.76% 74.56% 0.326 1.762
Conditional Volatility 31.42% 8.148% 22.53% 152.5% 3.837 24.36
Market Leverage 0.335 0.113 0.110 0.868 1.131 1.457
28Table 4. Descriptive statistics of simulated equilibrium small ﬁrm with fully idiosyncratic cash
ﬂow risk equity returns with CRRA preferences.
Unlevered Market
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.030% 1.053% -4.598% 5.151% 0.032 0.015
Monthly Returns 0.902% 5.871% -18.89% 24.73% 0.171 0.084
Conditional Volatility 20.00% 0.0% 20.00% 20.00% N.A. N.A.
Levered Market with Readjustment Every 5 Years
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.028% 1.172% -18.40% 23.82% 0.055 2.150
Monthly Returns 0.850% 9.548% -39.56% 74.65% 0.344 2.081
Conditional Volatility 31.44% 8.454% 22.54% 176.2% 4.127 28.66
Market Leverage 0.336 0.114 0.113 0.886 1.137 1.504
29Table 5. Descriptive statistics of simulated equilibrium market returns.
Unlevered Market
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.021% 0.764% -4.110% 4.769% 0.073 0.678
Monthly Returns 0.621% 4.198% -17.21% 23.47% 0.184 0.692
Conditional Volatility 13.95% 3.953% 1.798% 18.31% -0.836 -0.288
Levered Market with Readjustment Every 5 Years
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.028% 1.054% -6.099% 7.285% 0.089 0.961
Monthly Returns 0.849% 5.816% -25.50% 36.62% 0.280 1.043
Conditional Volatility 19.01% 6.254% 2.23% 28.84% -0.448 -0.752


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 7. Descriptive statistics of simulated asset prices for the small ﬁrm with systematic risk.
Unlevered
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.019% 1.295% -6.062% 6.632% 0.054 0.105
Monthly Returns 0.565% 7.146% -23.90% 38.04% 0.222 0.091
Conditional Volatility 24.47% 2.068% 20.08% 27.11% -0.387 -1.133
Levered with Readjustment Every 5 Years
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.029% 2.068% -62.31% 41.25% 0.121 9.817
Monthly Returns 0.847% 11.38% -70.49% 178.42% 0.832 8.902
Conditional Volatility 37.02% 12.85% 22.86% 491.96% 7.080 100.42







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 9. Descriptive statistics of simulated asset prices for the small ﬁrm with no systematic
risk.
Unlevered
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.017% 1.243% -5.656% 6.294% 0.050 0.093
Monthly Returns 0.498% 6.859% -23.22% 35.67% 0.213 0.076
Conditional Volatility 23.51% 1.815% 20.00% 25.95% -0.279 -1.227
Levered with Readjustment Every 5 Years
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Returns 0.025% 1.961% -55.38% 26.78% 0.033 5.780
Monthly Returns 0.732% 10.74% -77.40% 100.67% 0.456 3.021
Conditional Volatility 35.50% 11.32% 22.66% 470.42% 6.798 106.56































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Equilibrium properties of the pricing kernel and the market portfolio’s price-dividend



















































































































































































Figure 4. Conditional volatility of equity returns of the representative ﬁrm at diﬀerent states of the
economy, for a given debt service structure.
































































Figure 5. A 100 year window of observations from the simulated data at the market level.



























































































































Figure 6. Probability density estimates of daily observations from the simulated data. The solid
line denotes an unlevered economy. The dashed line denotes an economy with a 10 year annuity























































































Figure 7. Conditional volatility of equity returns of the small ﬁrm with both systematic and idiosyn-
cratic cash ﬂow risk at diﬀerent states of the economy, for a given debt service structure.

























































































































Figure 8. Probability density estimates of daily observations from the simulated data for the























































































Figure 9. Conditional volatility of equity returns of the small ﬁrm with idiosyncratic cash ﬂow risk
at diﬀerent states of the economy, for a given debt service structure.

























































































































Figure 10. Probability density estimates of daily observations from the simulated data for the
small ﬁrm with fully idiosyncratic cash ﬂow risk.
44